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The price, quality and distribution of mortgage payment protection 
insurance: A hedonic pricing approach 
 
 
Abstract 
Mortgage payment protection insurance (hereafter MPPI) provides varying combinations 
of accident, sickness and unemployment insurance and is used to protect the mortgage 
payments of policyholders in the event of a fall in income. Despite alleviating housing 
market failures, this service has been heavily criticised for providing poor value for money 
and being associated with unhelpful sales techniques especially when sold jointly with a 
mortgage in the UK. Consequently, the Competition Commission (2009) ruled that after 
February 2011 MPPI should not be sold jointly with mortgage lending within seven days 
of the credit transaction. We examine whether this prohibition was justified and if the form 
of distribution, either jointly with the mortgage or independently influences the premium 
levels. This assessment uses a hedonic pricing approach with details and premiums of 
MPPI policies in 2010 and 2012. Despite the success in reducing MPPI premium levels, 
we conclude that the Competition Commission judgement has raised concerns as to 
mortgagee protection. 
 
 
 
 
The price, quality and distribution of mortgage payment protection 
insurance: A hedonic pricing approach 
 
1.  Introduction 
Mortgage payment protection insurance (hereafter MPPI1) is an ‘add-on’ service providing 
varying combinations of accident, sickness and unemployment insurance and is used to 
protect the mortgage payments of policyholders in the event of a reduction in income. The 
provision of this insurance service has long been a UK policy priority to compliment the 
system of state income support for mortgagors (Department for Environment, Transport 
and the Regions, 2000). Nonetheless, this product has been heavily criticised for providing 
poor value for money and for being associated with unhelpful sales techniques especially 
when sold jointly with a mortgage (see Office of Fair Trading, 2006 [hereafter OFT]; 
Competition Commission, 2007, 2008, 2009)2. In 2009 the Competition Commission ruled 
that after February 2011 MPPI should not be sold jointly with lending.  A joint sale is 
defined as one within seven days of the credit agreement.  We investigate if this far-
reaching ruling is justified and specifically whether MPPI policies sold jointly with a base 
good, mortgages, are more expensive than policies sold independently for a given set of 
benefits and conditions, as predicted by regulators and extant theory (e.g. Ellison, 2004, 
Gabaix and Laibson, 2006). 
                                                          
1 Through the paper Mortgage payment protection insurance is denoted MPPI and payment 
protection insurance is denoted PPI. Different regulators are also referred to by their acronyms; 
the Office of Fair Trading as the OFT, the Financial Services Authority as the FSA and the 
Financial Conduct Authority as FCA. 
2 The provision and regulation of private mortgage insurance has a considerable lineage and has 
consistently raised disparate policy concerns internationally. PPI was developed in the USA in 1917 
(Baker and Siegelman, 2014) and has raised concerns since the 1950s (see Baker and Siegelman, 
2014, for further discussion). 
MPPI is a highly complex service combining a number of different types of 
insurance and has characteristics which vary across providers. We allow for this complexity 
by using the hedonic regression technique formalised by Rosen (1974) as a method of 
deriving monetary values for the attributes of composite goods. Through examining a 
nearly complete population of UK MPPI policies from August 2010 and June 2012 (797 
policies offered by 98 firms) we report that premium size declines together with the quality 
of MPPI policies, and that the take up in this market has declined. While independently 
and jointly distributed policies possess different characteristics, significant difference in 
premiums are reported, with MPPI policies sold independently having lower premiums 
than policies distributed jointly. The premium falls are robust to such quality changes and 
we conclude the Competition Commission (2009) prohibition of joint MPPI and mortgage 
sales is justified in terms of premium costs.  Nonetheless, concerns persist as to the social 
welfare implications of this regulatory decision. 
This investigation is important for four reasons. Firstly, there are clear economic 
incentives for firms distributing MPPI policies with mortgages to offer higher quality 
policies than firms independently distributing these policies. MPPI provides mortgage 
repayments in the event of a policyholder suffering a fall in income due to unemployment, 
critical illness or accident. In the event of a successful claim the policyholder and firm 
jointly providing a mortgage loan with MPPI are both beneficiaries of these pay-outs. The 
MPPI policyholder benefits from a pay-out in that their mortgage payments are made, they 
will not default on their mortgage and will not face the repossession of their home. The 
mortgage provider jointly distributing MPPI will also benefit through guaranteed mortgage 
repayments and reducing the trust required within the lending relationship (Lapavitsas, 
2007). A firm jointly distributing MPPI with mortgage lending therefore benefits from a 
policy with inclusive coverage, greater quality and higher pay-outs in the case of a 
successful claim. Conversely, an independent supplier of MPPI is not a recipient in the 
case of a successful claim and has no incentives to offer a higher quality MPPI policy. 
Subsequently providing MPPI jointly should lead to higher quality policies than providing 
MPPI independently. 
Secondly, while only a small proportion of households default on their mortgage 
debt (Figueira, Glen and Nellis, 2005) the costs of this outcome are high. For lenders 
mortgage default increases provisions for bad and doubtful debts. For government 
mortgage default can result in the re-housing the homeless and payment of housing 
support. For mortgagors default and repossession can significantly increase the incidence 
of mental illness (Pevalin, 2009) and cause emotional costs akin to marital breakdown or 
job loss (Taylor, Pevalin and Todd, 2007). Subsequently developing methods to reduce the 
number of mortgage defaults is socially and economically advantageous. MPPI has been 
widely promoted by successive UK governments to alleviate the problems associated with 
such defaults. However, the prohibition of selling MPPI jointly with credit within seven 
days of a sale may reduce the uptake of this form of private insurance, potentially creating 
wider social and economic costs. 
Thirdly, while the examination of add-on goods or services and their distribution 
has become a significant and influential theoretical theme in industrial and competition 
economics, empirical assessments of these circumstances are rare (Grubb, 2015). The 
MPPI market is a useful test of such theory, which predicts an add-on service provided 
jointly with a base good of primary interest to the customer (in this case a mortgage) would 
be priced differently to a service distributed independently. Specifically it has been argued 
that distributing a good jointly will influence how customers’ search for appropriate 
products (e.g. Ellison, 2004, Gabaix and Laibson, 2006). While the customer may actively 
search for the cheapest/highly quality base good, the aftermarkets for jointly sold add-on 
goods may display distinct competitive conditions. In such aftermarkets the conditions of 
sale may not be clear and the add-on goods’ utility, quality and cost may all be obscured 
using complex pricing formats and small print (Piccione and Spiegler, 2012, Sato, 2014). 
Therefore, some customers may make a purchase decision for an add-on good without 
realising the costs of this action. Thus price competition can be constrained and higher 
prices develop. Payment Protection Insurance (hereafter PPI) stands out as an important 
case due to the scale of the markets involved. Through examining a market where a service 
is both sold as an add-on and as an independent service the application and efficacy of the 
underlying theory can be explored.  
Lastly, at a time when questionable practices by banks in the levying of additional 
fees and charges for add-on services are seen globally (Tennant and Sutherland, 2014), the 
sale of PPI, its high profitability and the considerable costs of customer redress, make this 
a market worthy of further examination. The UK market for PPI peaked with around 20 
million policies in operation in 2006 (OFT, 2006) and prior to the 2009 regulatory 
intervention, this market was highly profitable and characterised by low pay-out ratios and 
high commissions.  Similar features existed in other national markets3. After the 
Competition Commission (2009) ruling a process of customer redress was initiated by the 
Financial Services Authority (hereafter FSA4). This process dealt with many of the 13 
million customer complaints made about UK PPI markets and had paid out over £20bn 
by July 2015 (Financial Conduct Authority, 2015, hereafter FCA). Despite the substantial 
costs of this regulatory process, academic work examining this judgement has to date been 
limited (see FCA, 2014). 
                                                          
3 For example PPI pay-out ratios ranged from 40% to 80% of premiums in the USA (Federal Trade 
Commission, 2001) with average commissions on PPI averaging 59% (OFT, 2006) in the over the 
2000 to 2005 period in the UK.   
4 On 1 April 2013 the Financial Services Authority was replaced by the Financial Conduct 
Authority. 
This study therefore contributes to the literatures on MPPI and PPI by examining 
a distinct policy orientated question; whether policyholders pay more for this service when 
it is distributed jointly rather than independently. This question is so framed to examine 
the rationale of the significant regulatory intervention by the UK competition authorities 
into this market; an intervention which has yet to investigated. This study, therefore, 
contributes to the emergent literature examining PPI markets and the impact of the 
significant UK regulatory intervention in 2009. Further, by examining a case where services 
have been distributed jointly as an add-on good and independently, theoretical predictions 
as to the operation of such markets may be evaluated. The regulatory decision to constrain 
the joint sale of an add-on good is related to concurrent developments in the economic 
theory of add-on goods.  Lastly, this study builds on an existing literature examining MPPI, 
through addressing distinct consumer protection and competition concerns. 
The study is organised into five sections. After this introduction we give an 
overview of the pertinent academic and regulatory literature. The third section outlines the 
data and the form of the analysis. The fourth section reports the empirical results. Lastly, 
we present a summary of the research, policy implications and conclusions. 
 
 
2. Literature examining mortgage payment protection insurance. 
The literature surrounding the provision of MPPI has been influenced, and to a certain 
degree led, by the on-going policy discussions surrounding this financial service. These 
debates have considered the requirements for private mortgage protection, the low take 
up of this service and more recently consumer protection and competitiveness concerns. 
The longest standing of all MPPI policy concerns has been whether this service 
can be an effective private sector source of mortgagee protection. While UK governments 
since 1948 have supported mortgagors claiming unemployment benefits (e.g. national 
assistance, supplementary benefit, income support and job seekers allowance; see Ford and 
Quilgars, 2001) this welfare safety net was curtailed in 1987 and 1995, extended in 2009 
and reduced again in 2010. The suitability of MPPI as a ‘private sector’ source of mortgagee 
support to replace this eroding public ‘safety net’ has engendered much discussion. 
Academic examinations have focused on the perceived quality and costs of UK MPPI 
services reporting this service was very expensive, limited in coverage, contains regressive 
elements (Burchardt and Hill, 1998) and had not prevented a sizable proportion of MPPI 
policyholders developing mortgage arrears (Ford and England, 2000, Ford and Quilgars, 
2001). 
Despite such concerns MPPI has been promoted by subsequent UK governments 
to facilitate sustainable home ownership (e.g. Department of Environment, Transport and 
the Regions, 2000), enhance customer engagement with financial markets (see Moloney, 
2010) and support UK government policies such as the right to buy (Ford and England, 
2000). While this approach and other changes have reduced the number of households 
unable to access credit and subject to discriminatory practices, there has been an associated 
decline in the quality of UK mortgage lending overall (Stephens and Quilgars, 2008)5. 
MPPI has been repeatedly advanced as a convenient solution to address the challenges 
raised by burgeoning UK home ownership by low income households, unskilled workers 
and older people (Ford, 2004). Academic contributions have subsequently questioned why 
                                                          
5 The market for MPPI also augments the cover provided by other financial services used to protect 
lenders from default risks and developed in response to changes in government support for 
mortgagors. For example, mortgage indemnity guarantees are used in the UK to cover lenders in a 
case of default on higher loan to value mortgages (see Stephens, 2003). This coverage is extended 
by MPPI to include mortgagees as well as lenders, for cases of illness, unemployment or accidents. 
the take up of MPPI had been poor6, reporting a limited link between premium levels and 
policy demand, the experience of unemployment as a determinant of MPPI take up (Pryce 
and Keoghan, 2001) and the link between household savings and age of the mortgagor 
with the propensity to use MPPI (Ford, Quilgars, Burrows, and Rhoades, 2004). 
In the USA similar concerns have been investigated. Here it has been reported that 
the use of MPPI raises the level of mortgage application acceptance for all groups and 
particularly those where racial and social characteristics might otherwise lead to 
discrimination or ‘red-lining’. Offering MPPI therefore enables banks to satisfy legislative 
demands not to discriminate in mortgage lending and has resulted in many previously 
excluded households obtaining housing finance (Ross and Tootell, 2004). This said, 
mortgagees with unstable work histories and ill health problems continue to be excluded 
from these policies (Diaz-Serrano, 2005). 
During the 2000s major regulatory assessments of MPPI and PPI markets  
addressed consumer protection concerns. In the UK the provision of PPI was repeatedly 
examined by the FSA (FSA, 2005, 2006, 2007a, 2007b) and the OFT (OFT, 2006) with 
matters coming to a head with the Competition Commission (2009) ruling. Specifically this 
ruling stated that joint sales of PPI with credit (unsecured lending, credit card debt and 
mortgages) are prohibited within seven days of the credit agreement, single premium 
insurance policies should not be employed, greater customer information provision is 
required and PPI should be unbundled from other financial services. This ruling and the 
subsequent process of customer redress was prompted by claims of mis-selling and the 
excessive price of PPI within a variety of credit markets. Similar regulatory concerns and 
debates have been witnessed in the USA involving Senate hearings in the 1970s, 
                                                          
6 The MPPI market remained one of the smaller PPI markets accounting for £607m for first 
mortgages and £251m for second mortgages and secured lending in 2007 (Competition 
Commission, 2009). 
consideration of coercive sales (United States General Accounting Office, 1990) and the 
criticism of ‘packing’ PPI within home and consumer loans (Federal Trade Commission, 
2001). 
These consumer protection and competition themes within MPPI markets have 
received sparse attention in the academic literature with most contributions examining 
other PPI markets be these in the UK or the USA. For example in the UK Ranyard and 
McHugh (2012) examined customer decision making in PPI markets, reporting the 
willingness to pay for PPI is insensitive to large changes in the quality of cover. Ashton 
and Hudson (2014), examining unsecured lending PPI over the 1998 to 2011 period, 
reported that interest rates on loans were significantly lower when the loans were offered 
with PPI. Ferran (2012) provides a legal overview of the PPI mis-selling episode and 
regulatory decisions. US examinations of PPI have examined a variety of regulatory and 
policy concerns including the limited competitiveness of these markets, overpriced policies 
(Allen and Chan, 1998), excessive coverage provided (Cyrnak and Canner, 1986), the often 
very small quantities insured (Durkin and Elliehausen, 2012), tying arrangements (Polden, 
1983) and the legal treatment of payment protection policies generally (Spahr and Escolas, 
1986). Discussion of on-going policy issues in US PPI markets is provided by Baker and 
Siegelman (2014). 
 
 
3. Data and Forms of Analysis 
3.1 The Data Employed 
The data for this study was provided by the FSA comparison website on MPPI and 
includes information on 275 policies provided by 60 financial services firms in August 2010 
and 702 policies provided by 62 financial services firms in June 2012. The data provides 
policy information for monthly mortgage payments of £500, £1,000, £1,500, and £2,000 
borrowed by a 20, 40 and 60 year old employed person working 40 hours per week (data 
for £500 borrowed by a 20 year old in 2010 and for £2000 cover on jointly distributed 
policies in 2012 was unavailable). As premium levels of individual policies vary with the 
age of the policyholder and with the loan repayment covered by the policy, each policy 
generates a number of different observations which vary by premium levels. Therefore, 
this policy information for different age and mortgage payment groups provides 3691 
observations for 2010 and 6508 observations for 20127. 
The MPPI market examined differs from other PPI markets. Relative to other PPI 
markets, MPPI customers are more likely to shop around for this insurance service (OFT 
2006), MPPI has received fewer complaints which have been upheld (Financial Conduct 
Authority, 2014) and while other PPI services insure relatively small quantities, MPPI often 
provides cover for significant values. The Competition Commission (2009) further 
reported that unlike unsecured lending and credit card PPI where no relationship between 
premiums and policy quality is observed a weak relationship between the premium price 
and policy quality exists for MPPI. 
                                                          
7 The word ‘policy’ in the insurance sector can have different meanings depending on the context 
in which it is used. Sometimes it is used to represent a product that is offered to the market. 
Alternatively, this term is employed to refer to the specific contractual arrangement between an 
insurance company and a consumer for which a certificate or other legal document would be issued 
after the consumer has bought insurance. In this study we examine product level data not data at 
the level of individual contracts. The 275 policies represent different MPPI insurance products that 
would be available for consumers to purchase.  The price paid for a specific product by a specific 
purchaser would depend on the circumstances of the purchaser particularly their age and the level 
of loan repayment covered. There are a huge number of combinations of age and loan repayment 
amounts so the FSA collected details for particular specimen combinations.  By reporting the 
different premiums and policy characteristics for policies (products) offered to 20, 40 and 60 year 
olds and for mortgage repayments of £500, £1,000, £1,500, and £2,000 a total of 3691 different 
observations are generated in 2010 and 6508 observations generated in 2012. All such 
characteristics result in different premium values for the policies (products). 
The MPPI policies were distributed either independently or jointly with a mortgage 
loan, with a small number of firms distributing both jointly and independently. In 2010 26 
firms issued 34 jointly distributed policies and 38 firms issued 245 independently 
distributed policies. After the prohibition of joint MPPI sales within seven days of a credit 
agreement on the 14th February 2011, the number of jointly distributed MPPI products 
fell and by June 2012 only 7 firms were offering 9 policies jointly with credit (sold seven 
days after the initial credit agreement). In contrast 56 firms offered 694 MPPI policies 
independently of a credit agreement. Therefore a market structure favourable to the 
creation of a competitive market existed, with a greater number of independent suppliers 
offering a range of policies to the market and a limited number of supplier firms jointly 
selling a constrained range of MPPI policies. 
In parallel to this change the number of policies available on the market increased 
considerably. In 2010 all but a handful of major mortgage providers provided MPPI 
policies which were jointly sold.  The vast majority of customers taking out mortgages will 
have been targets for a jointly sold MPPI policy from the same provider.  Although 
definitive market figures are not available it is almost certain that the vast majority of MPPI 
contracts entered into will have involved a jointly sold policy.  In 2010 the independently 
sold MPPI policies were largely offered by relatively small providers who did not also offer 
mortgages.  These providers generally will have had much less market power in that they 
would have had much less easy access to customers at the point they were taking out a 
mortgage. 
By 2012 most of the large mortgage providers had pulled out of the MPPI market 
entirely selling neither independently nor jointly. Presumably this was on the assumption 
that without access to customers at the point of mortgage sale, the market would no longer 
be attractive.  Although the overall volume of MPPI contracts taken out probably dropped 
considerably there was potentially greater opportunities to market independently sold 
contracts as many more, generally relatively small firms, entered this market with new 
policies. The 7 firms still selling jointly only represented a small part of the mortgage 
market. Four are small regional building societies, two are small commercial organisations 
and one is a large bank although not one that has specialised in the mortgage market. 
The quality of a MPPI policy depends fundamentally on the terms and conditions 
under which benefits are payable. The relevant terms and conditions are explained in Table 
1. While this data includes all firms which provided data for the FSA site and includes an 
almost complete record of the population of policies issued at the time, there are 
omissions. Some firms have refused to have their policies listed on this website; these firms 
are consistent over the two data collection periods limiting any selection bias. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 
 
This data is distinct from that used in past studies of MPPI (e.g. Burchardt and 
Hill, 1998, Ford and England, 2000, Ford and Quilgars, 2001, Ford, Quilgars, Burrows and 
Rhoades, 2004, 2004, Pryce and Keoghan, 2001) as it considers MPPI policy details and 
premiums rather than survey evidence. It is believed that this is the first study of the MPPI 
market to use policy data rather than survey data. This choice of data brings both benefits 
and drawbacks. While policy data offers comprehensive details of the attributes of the 
policies offered, it does not provide indications of which policies have been chosen by 
mortgagees or the reasons for these purchase decisions. We freely acknowledge it would 
be optimal to employ data on the number of policies sold as well the details of policies 
bought, although such data is of a proprietary nature and not publically available. We 
further acknowledge this data had to be collected in different months of the year following 
FSA decisions regarding public access to the website. While the use of data collected at 
different times of the year may have introduced seasonal influences into the analysis, these 
differences are limited by the low frequency of policy changes. A full list of the firms 
providing MPPI in 2010 and 2012 is provided in Appendix 1. 
 
3.2 The Testing Framework 
The testing framework is divided into two parts. Initially, descriptive statistics of the dataset 
are considered and differences between independent and joint distribution are recorded 
for both premiums and policy characteristics. Where appropriate differences between 
policies which are jointly and independently distributed are tested using t and Z tests 
depending on data format. In the study quality is considered as a list of attributes which 
come at a price. Subsequently we investigate the distribution and frequency of these 
attributes and how the price of a given attribute varies over time and between independent 
sellers and joint sellers of MPPI. 
Secondly, the costs of the different policy characteristics and restrictions are 
quantified using a hedonic regression model. Hedonic regression techniques (Rosen, 1974) 
are employed as a method of deriving monetary values for the attributes of composite 
goods. Composite or differentiated goods can be described by a vector of different 
characteristics; these are detailed in Table 1 for the MPPI policies considered8. Table 1 also 
considers the way the various policy features are quantified and the sign of their expected 
coefficient in the regression; the expected relationship between the policy characteristic 
                                                          
8 We acknowledge these characteristics are incomplete and other characteristics may be influential. 
For example, the type of employment undertaken by a policyholder, the ability to stop and start 
payments on mortgages and the duration of previous employment could all affect premium costs. 
Sadly, information on all possible characteristics was unavailable.     
and premium size. The expected influence of these policy conditions for the pricing of 
MPPI premiums vary in terms of the costs or benefits of including these characteristics. A 
positive relationship between premiums and benefit coverage, age, maximum payments, 
back to day one cover, portability and acceptance of backache and stress is predicted as 
these will contribute to the costs of the policy. A negative relationship between premiums 
and the waiting periods for both unemployment and accidents and sickness are predicted, 
as premiums should decline as waiting periods are raised. 
Rosen showed that the implicit value of characteristics can be estimated by 
determining how the market price of products is affected by the vector of characteristics 
associated with the product. Essentially, in a competitive market, the price of a product is 
a function of its characteristics: 
 
P(A)  = P(a1, a2,…..,an)    
 (1) 
 
While there is no strong theoretical basis for choosing a particular functional form 
(see Halverson and Pollakowsji, 1981, Rosen, 1974) it is important to employ a functional 
form which reflects the circumstances considered by the model (see Can and Megolugbe, 
1997). Following other studies examining product quality (e.g. Wilson and Wilson, 2014) 
and its established position in this literature (Malpezzi, 2002) a log-linear functional form9 
is employed. This model form is written as: 
                                                          
9 This model allows the monetary value of a policy to depend in part on the characteristics of the 
policy, has coefficients with simple and appealing interpretations, mitigates heteroskedasticity 
problems, is computationally simple and can incorporate considerable specification flexibility 
(Malpezzi, 2002). 
 ln P = β0 + β1a1  + β2a2 + ……..  + βnan + ε   (2) 
 
where lnP is the natural logarithm of monthly premiums, βi (i = 0,...n) are the n coefficients 
of the hedonic regression and  is the error term10.  As already mentioned, the product 
characteristics ai(i = 0,...n) are detailed in Table 1. 
There are empirical issues in fitting such a model.  It is possible that some of the 
product characteristics are highly correlated, which would lead to problems with multi-
collinearity, so it is appropriate to allow for this possibility which we do in the results 
section.  In theory the model may also suffer if important product characteristics are 
omitted.  Butler (1982) and Ozanne and Malpezzi (1985) show that the coefficients of 
independent variables in the hedonic equation may not be particularly robust with respect 
to omitted variables.  Omitted variable bias, however, is likely to be modest within our 
investigation, as the express purpose of the FSA comparison website was to enable policies 
to be compared across all major product characteristics.  In addition the overall predictions 
from hedonic models, as opposed to predictions of individual coefficients, are quite robust 
to problems with omitted variables (Malpezzi, 2002). 
A further point of interest related to the application of a hedonic model is what is 
judged to be the scope of the competitive market. It is clear independently sold policies 
place no constraints on prospective purchasers to favour one policy over another. This 
situation is less clear-cut for jointly sold policies. While some purchasers will compare the 
price and features of jointly sold policies with independently sold policies, this is often not 
                                                          
10 As the data is considered as two separate cross sections for 2010 and 2012, concerns with time 
variation or spatial distribution seen in other applications of the hedonic model do not apply in 
this case (see Helbich, Brunauer, Vaz and Nijkamp, 2014, Tse, 2002 for further discussion). 
the case. Therefore the independently sold policies can be assumed to be sold in a 
competitive market, while this is not necessarily the case for the jointly sold policies.  Given 
this, five forms of the hedonic regression model (2) are estimated. Initially, the model is 
estimated for independently distributed policies which will give estimates of the 
coefficients which are consistent with the implicit value of the coefficients in a competitive 
market. The model is subsequently estimated separately for jointly distributed policies and 
for both types of policy combined. These estimates allow an assessment of the extent to 
which the coefficients are consistent with those found in the model estimated of 
independently distributed policies. 
We then consider the relative premiums of policies, which are jointly or 
independently distributed. This is done using two different approaches which are 
consistent with different assumptions about market scope. The first approach assumes that 
all policies, however sold, form part of a single competitive market and the value of any 
particular product attribute can be found in that market (scenario i). This is undertaken by 
estimating equation (2) for all policies using a dummy variable in the regression to denote 
independently distributed policies. This procedure allows comparison with estimates 
derived using all policies to determine whether independent policies are indeed cheaper 
than jointly distributed policies, taking account of their policy characteristics. The second 
approach assumes that jointly sold policies do not form part of a competitive market and 
so the value of product attributes should be obtained from independently sold policies 
(scenario ii). This is done by estimating equation (2) for all policies whilst constraining the 
coefficients in the regression to be equal to the corresponding coefficients when only 
independent policies are included whilst also using a dummy variable to denote 
independent policies. This procedure allows direct measurement of the premium savings 
available if policies with the same features as those currently sold jointly were instead 
purchased in a competitive market. In both scenarios to determine the expected monetary 
saving of buying a policy independently instead of jointly we algebraically manipulate 
equation (2). This manipulation shows that the independent cost is a factor of e-D of the 
joint cost, where D is the coefficient of the independent distribution dummy variable in 
Panel D and E of Tables 4 and 5. 
 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Descriptive Assessment 
A descriptive assessment of the MPPI premium levels is provided in Table 2. This table is 
divided into Panel A and B for 2010 and 2012 respectively. In Panel A premium costs rise 
with the level of cover.  In addition, the age of MPPI policyholders influences the premium 
costs for policies sold independently, with younger applicants paying less for MPPI 
policies. This probably reflects both a smaller chance of younger applicants suffering illness 
and the chance of older applicants selecting against the insurers. This selection would occur 
when older applicants with an existing mortgage seek to buy this insurance because of 
private knowledge that their circumstances have changed such that they are more likely to 
make a claim. This age effect is not observed for the jointly sold policies, possibly reflecting 
a lower incidence of older people taking out mortgages which makes setting appropriate 
rates less material, but also because the individuals taking out these polices will be less likely 
to select against the insurers. At ages 20 and 40 the cost of policies sold independently 
tends to be lower (often at statistically significantly levels) than jointly sold MPPI policies. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 
For Panel B considering 2012 we observe that premiums generally increase with 
age for independently but not jointly sold policies. At ages 20 and 40 independently 
distributed policies are again cheaper than jointly distributed MPPI policies. Comparing 
the premium costs in 2010 and 2012 we observe that all jointly distributed policy premiums 
fall between 3 and 20 per cent between August 2010 and June 2012. Premium changes, 
although not always reductions, are also observed for most age and coverage categories for 
independently distributed policies with changes varying from 16 per cent premium 
increases to 19 per cent falls in premium levels11. In Panel C of Table 2, t tests are used to 
quantify the statistical significance of these differences between 2010 and 2012 premium 
levels. In 7 of 11 age and coverage categories there are significant differences in premium 
levels. Significant falls in premiums are also recorded for jointly and independently 
distributed policies in some age and coverage groups. Notwithstanding quality differences 
between policies, MPPI premiums have tended to decline to a significant extent since the 
2011 prohibition of joint sales within seven days of the credit agreement. 
The quality of MPPI policies is reported in Table 3. Again this table is divided into 
two panels for 2010 and 2012. Neither set of jointly or independently distributed MPPI 
policies provides a dominant set of benefits in either year. On average the policies sold 
jointly provide a lower maximum number of monthly mortgage payments. Little difference 
is observed between jointly and independently distributed MPPI policies for other 
attributes; for example the provision of cover to day one of the initial claim and whether 
pre-existing conditions are excluded or otherwise. It can be seen, however, that the 
incidence of beneficial policy attributes does reflect the priorities of the institution that 
                                                          
11 These premium changes are not adjusted for inflation; when considering the effect of inflation 
this fall in premiums is more pronounced. One widely used measure of inflation, the Consumer 
Price Index rose 6.44% between August 2010 and June 2012 – figures are from the UK Office for 
National Statistics. 
 
sold it. As discussed above firms selling policies independently are much more exposed to 
selection and so it is not surprising that independently sold policies have substantially 
longer waiting periods. Independently sold policies are also far more likely to be portable 
than jointly sold policies. This may reflect firms distributing MPPI policies jointly desiring 
to retain mortgagors. Independently sold policies also tend to offer additional benefits and 
are much less likely to cover claims due to backache and stress in 2010. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 
 
Comparing Panels A and B, a range of differences between 2010 and 2012 are 
observed. A number of the policy characteristics have changed in nature, or frequency of 
occurrence, in such a way as to indicate policy quality may have declined. For example the 
maximum number of payments has fallen, back to day one cover is included in a lower 
proportion of policies and waiting times before claims has risen on average. Other policy 
characteristics have remained unchanged such as the potential to access additional benefits. 
Lastly, the portability of policies has risen after the prohibition of joint sales. We can also 
observe in 2012 the ‘quality’ differences between independent and jointly sold policies have 
declined, with fewer significant differences observed between jointly and independently 
distributed policies in 2012, than in 2010. Further, the effect of the prohibition on joint 
sales within seven days, has been to reduce the incidence of many beneficial policy 
attributes of jointly sold policies. 
 
4.2 Results of the Hedonic Pricing Model 
Before applying the hedonic pricing model we consider whether there will be problems 
with multi-collinearity by examining the correlations between the various product features.  
These are shown in the two panels of Table 4 which relate to 2010 and 2012 respectively.  
There are elements of correlation between the features which are statistically significant 
although these are generally not very large in magnitude.  The only features that show very 
high levels of correlation are coverage of stress and coverage of backache.  Consequently 
coverage of stress is suppressed in the subsequent hedonic regressions to avoid issues with 
multi-collinearity.  All the other features are retained in the hedonic regressions as the 
overall fit of the model is more important for our investigation that the precise magnitude 
of the coefficients of particular features. 
 
INSERT TABLE 4 
 
The hedonic regression model results are reported in Tables 5 and 6 for 2010 and 
2012 respectively. In each table we report model results for all annual observations, jointly 
and independently distributed policies and further models to examine the influence of joint 
or independent distribution of MPPI policies. In both Tables 5 and 6 Panel A shows the 
results of the hedonic regressions for the independent policies. The market for these 
policies can be classified as competitive so the theoretical analysis of Rosen (1974) will be 
applicable. The regression is highly satisfactory with most coefficients being significant and 
having the expected signs, in accordance with the last column of Table 1, in both years. 
The overall equation is significant at a very high level and has an R2 statistic in the region 
of 70 per cent for 2010 and 2012. 
Panel B in both tables shows the results of the hedonic regression for the jointly 
sold policies. The market for these policies may not be fully competitive so the theoretical 
analysis of Rosen (1974) may not be totally applicable. Nonetheless the regression for 2010 
is satisfactory in many respects in that most of the coefficients are significant and have the 
expected signs. Due to the limited number of observations employed, the results for 2012 
(Table 6) are limited with a number of omitted variables. The overall equation is significant 
with R2 statistics of over 80 per cent for 2010 and 90 per cent for 2012. 
Panel C for Tables 5 and 6 shows the results of the hedonic regression for all the 
policies. Again the market for the jointly sold policies may not be fully competitive so the 
theoretical analysis of Rosen (1974) may not be fully applicable. Nonetheless the regression 
still has coefficients with the expected signs and generally a very high level of significance. 
The overall equation is significant at a very high level and has an R2 statistics in the region 
of 70% for both years. 
Panel D for both Tables shows the results of the hedonic regression for all policies 
with a dummy for policies that are sold independently. This allows comparison with Panel 
C to see if independent policies are indeed cheaper than jointly distributed policies, when 
taking account of their policy characteristics in a competitive market (scenario i). In 2010 
the dummy for independent policies is negative and significant showing that these policies 
are 12.81 per cent cheaper for a given set of policy characteristics than jointly distributed 
policies. For 2012 a positive but statistically insignificant estimate is recorded which 
indicates independently distributed MPPI policies are no longer cheaper than jointly 
distributed policies. 
Panel E for both Tables 5 and 6 shows the results of the hedonic regression for all 
the policies with a dummy for policies that are sold independently and with the regression 
coefficients for policy features constrained to be equal to those found in the hedonic 
regression for independently sold policies. This allows a direct measure of the premium 
savings available if policies with the same features as those currently sold jointly were 
instead purchased in a competitive market (scenario ii). The dummy for independent 
policies is negative and significant in 2010 showing that policies with a given set of features 
would be 13.483 per cent cheaper in a competitive market only containing independently 
distributed products. In 2012 this result is statistically insignificant indicating independently 
distributed policies are no longer significantly cheaper than jointly distributed policies. 
 
INSERT TABLES 5 & 6 
 
As previously discussed, the hedonic regression model assumes that all the policies 
operate in a competitive market, so whether the  unconstrained or constrained regression 
provides the more appropriate results depends on the scope of the competitive market, in 
particular, whether the jointly sold policies can be considered to be being sold in a 
competitive market.  It seems unlikely that the jointly sold policies can be considered to be 
competing entirely on equal terms with independently sold policies, so the results of the 
constraint regression shown in Panel E are likely to be the more appropriate. However, 
the results obtained for scenario i) and ii) (reported in Panels D and E) are actually very 
similar so our result is empirically and qualitatively robust to the theoretical market scope 
consideration. For 2010 we can deduce that the independently sold policies are between 
12.81 and 13.48 per cent cheaper than those MPPI policies sold jointly. Comparable 
estimates for 2012 indicate independently sold policies are between 3.34 per cent cheaper 
and 4.92 per cent more expensive than those MPPI policies sold jointly, although these 
estimates are not significantly different from zero.  We can conclude that in 2012 there is 
no significant difference between the prices of independently and jointly sold policies. 
  
5. Conclusions 
This study uses a hedonic pricing model to investigate the interactions between the 
premiums, policy quality and distribution of mortgage protection insurance (MPPI). This 
study addresses whether MPPI is relatively expensive when these policies are distributed 
jointly with mortgages relative to being distributed independently of mortgage sales. In this 
concluding section we consider a brief summary of the study findings, the pertinence of 
policy responses and recommendations for further work. 
We report that MPPI policies sold independently had lower premiums in the age 
range where people are likely to be taking out mortgages. Policy characteristics and 
conditions vary between policies sold jointly and those sold independently. One group of 
policies is not dominant in this respect but the conditions reflect the circumstances of the 
institutions providing them. Hedonic analysis of the independently sold policies indicates 
that their premiums reflect the quality of the policy in terms of its coverage and conditions. 
The policies sold jointly are clearly more expensive for a given set of benefits and 
conditions than policies sold independently in 2010, suggesting uncompetitive premium 
levels. Further, after the prohibition of the joint sale of MPPI with mortgages within seven 
days of the credit agreement, the incidence of beneficial policy attributes declines and the 
inflated cost of jointly distributed policies dissipates. 
In light of this assessment the Competition Commission (2009) prohibition of joint 
sales of MPPI policies within seven days of a mortgage transaction may be justified in 
terms of reducing premium costs, yet may not be an optimal solution for the UK housing 
market. While our analysis supports the conclusions of the Competition Commission 
(2009) regarding the excessive premiums of jointly sold MPPI policies we consider MPPI 
to be a special case due to its social and economic importance. The policy challenge is 
whether policies supporting financial responsibility are subsidiary to the consumer 
protection and competition concerns raised by the Competition Commission. The 
prohibition of joint MPPI sales has reduced the quality of many policies and will at least 
disrupt a market aimed at providing a private insurance ‘safety net’ for mortgagors; a form 
of insurance advocated and promoted by successive governments. In this case consumer 
protection concerns appear to have been more influential than policy initiatives to enhance 
personal financial responsibility. While we have found that jointly distributed add-on 
services are more expensive, as predicted by extant theory (e.g. Ellison, 2004, Gabaix and 
Laibson, 2006, removing joint sales can also result in less predictable outcomes. Indeed we 
are aware that the change will have social welfare implications. 
Clearly further research is required to assess the longer-term influence of this 
prohibition. Questions requiring further assessment include whether the take-up of MPPI 
has declined further and if this market is viable going forward given that almost all large 
mortgage providers have pulled entirely out of the MPPI market. If this market has become 
an irrelevance since the Competition Commission prohibition, what methods and financial 
services are developing to replace MPPI to ensure housing finance is available to all (see 
Gibbs, Maclennan and Stephens, 2013, FSA, 2013). Determining the efficacy of any new 
methods of mortgagee support and their impact on both lenders and mortgagees is 
essential. Notwithstanding the high costs and often sub-optimal methods by which MPPI 
was distributed, this service did constrain many of the challenges facing participants in the 
UK mortgage market including high house prices, variable forms of mortgage contract and 
growing mortgagee uncertainty. It is hoped the prohibition of MPPI will not disadvantage 
mortgagees in navigating these on-going challenges due to a prohibition arising from the 
poor behaviour of lenders. 
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Table 1: Explanation of MPPI Policy Characteristics, Measurement and Expected Relationship with Premium Size 
The data has been obtained from the FSA comparison website. For each policy characteristic the table gives an explanation of the characteristic, the way it is measured 
and whether it has a positive or negative expected relationship with the policy premium.  
Characteristic Explanation, Measurement and Expected Relationship with Premium 
Distribution dummy 
variable   
The form of distribution either jointly with the mortgage lender (denoted 1) or independently and not with the 
mortgage (denoted 0)  
Dummy 
Effect on 
premium 
Benefit Coverage The monthly mortgage  payment to be covered in the case of a claim Amount in £s +ve 
Age The age of the policyholder Age in years +ve 
Maximum monthly 
mortgage payments 
The maximum number of monthly payments that a policyholder can receive if they make a claim. 
Number in 
Months 
+ve 
Waiting Period 
Some policies do not pay benefits immediately. The waiting period is the period the policyholder has to wait before 
making a claim and may due to the cause of the claim.  
Period in 
days 
-ve 
Back to day one cover 
This feature concerns whether the insurer backdates claims to the first day of accident, sickness or unemployment.  
For example, if a policyholder falls ill on 1st January and the policy has a waiting period of 30 days the policy would 
normally start to pay out on 31st January.  If the policy has back to day one cover the payments will be backdated to 
the 1st January. 
Dummy 
Y=1, N=0 
-ve 
Pre-existing conditions 
excluded 
Some policies do not cover medical conditions that a policyholder already has when they take out the policy until a 
certain period has elapsed. This is known as the pre-existing conditions period. 
Dummy 
Y=1, N=0 
+ve 
Portability 
Policies are portable if they can be taken with the policyholder if they move their mortgage to another lender.  It is 
undesirable cancel a policy on moving lenders as the policyholder may lose cover for pre-existing medical conditions 
as well as facing the problem that premiums may have increased. 
Dummy 
Y=1, N=0 
-ve 
Backache 
Backache is problematic for insurers because it is difficult to determine whether a claimant is genuinely suffering from 
the complaint. Often cover is restricted to cases where closely defined medical evidence is provided. Typical 
restrictions might be ‘You will not receive monthly benefit for any disability or unemployment caused by or resulting 
from any of the following: - backache or related conditions unless there is supporting medical evidence. Such evidence 
may be a report from an appropriate specialist or from your doctor, in both cases an MRI, CT scan or equivalent may 
be required.’ 
Dummy 
Y=1, N=0 
+ve 
Stress 
Stress is problematic for insurers because it is difficult to determine whether a claimant is genuinely suffering from 
the complaint.  Often cover is restricted to cases where closely defined medical evidence is provided. For example, 
typical restrictions might be ‘You will not receive monthly benefit for any disability or unemployment caused by or 
resulting from any of the following: - stress, anxiety, depression, mental or nervous disorder or any condition of a 
psychoneurotic origin unless certified by and under the continuing care of a consultant psychiatric specialist’  
Dummy 
Y=1, N=0 
+ve 
Table 2: Cost of monthly MPPI cover and policy characteristics and restrictions   
The table shows the cost of MPPI cover in 2010 and 2012 for a selection of cover levels and policy 
holder ages, 
Panel A Cost of monthly MPPI cover 2010 
Averages Monthly 
MPPI cost £’s 
Independent 
distribution (245 
policies) 
Joint distribution  
(34 policies) 
Total  (275† 
policies) 
T test  
(Ind. 
premium 
less Joint  
Premium) 
Full time employee/ 
Age  
Mean St dev. Mean St dev. Mean St dev. 
£2000 
cover  
20 years  99.98 36.00 117.33 24.13 101.26 35.52  -2.12* 
40 years  106.98 31.51 117.24 24.79 107.70 33.16 -1.39 
60 years 127.45 50.86 116.83 24.20 126.67 31.16 0.92 
£1500 
cover  
20 years 66.48 29.87 84.51 17.95 67.99 29.47 -3.25** 
40 years 73.53 25.23 84.34 18.25 74.41 24.89 -2.26* 
60 years 102.83 40.08 84.31 18.80 101.28 39.07  2.50* 
 
£1000 
cover 
20 years 44.13 19.89 55.70 12.55 45.15 19.62  -3.13** 
40 years 49.02 16.75 55.54 12.54 49.53 16.53 -2.08* 
60 years 68.59 26.60 55.50 12.67 67.44 25.94  2.75* 
 
£500 
cover 
20 years n/a n/a n/a n/a 
40 years 22.13 9.98 28.38 6.20 22.59 9.88  -3.21** 
60 years 34.35 13.27 27.81 6.43 33.80 12.95   2.71** 
Panel B Cost of monthly MPPI cover 2012 
Averages Monthly 
MPPI cost £’s 
Independent 
distribution (694 
policies) 
Joint distribution 
(9 policies) 
Total  (702† 
policies) 
T test 
(Ind. 
premium 
less Joint  
Premium) 
Full time employee/ 
Age  
Mean St dev. Mean St dev. Mean St dev. 
£2000 
cover  
20 years  102.17 33.25 n/a 102.17 33.25 n/a 
40 years  104.75 31.24 n/a 104.75 31.24 n/a 
60 years 122.99 46.81 n/a 122.99 46.81 n/a 
£1500 
cover  
20 years 66.47 27.27 75.98 16.09 66.64 27.16 -1.413 
40 years 75.52 24.78 75.98 16.09 75.52 24.67 -0.045 
60 years 96.81 40.55 75.98 16.09 96.50 40.37 3.030* 
 
£1000 
cover 
20 years 35.51 19.46 46.14 12.36 35.62 19.42  -2.401* 
40 years 42.30 17.54 46.14 12.36 42.34 17.49 -0.617 
60 years 79.07 35.71 46.14 12.36 78.70 35.70  7.202** 
 
£500 
cover 
20 years 17.68 9.53 22.49 6.03 17.73 9.51  -2.363* 
40 years 21.57 9.18 22.49 6.03 21.58 9.15 0.302 
60 years 40.10 18.26 22.49 6.03 39.88 18.26    8.304** 
Panel C T Tests of differences in premiums between 2010 and 2012 
 £2000 cover £1500 cover £1000 cover £500 cover 
Overall 
 
 
20 years     2.297** -1.301  -4.852** n/a 
40 years -0.805     3.603** -3.37** -0.229 
60 years    -2.113** -0.453   4.728**     4.827** 
Joint policies 
only 
20 years n/a -1.152 -2.031* n/a 
40 years n/a -1.115 -2.000*   -2.614* 
60 years n/a -1.082 -1.979*   -2.369* 
Independent 
policies only 
20 years  0.712 -0.082 -6.579** n/a 
40 years -0.741  1.143 -5.820** -0.794 
60 years -0.712  -2.025*  5.221**      5.769** 
** denotes statistically significant at 5%, * denotes 10% significance 
†Note the total number of policies is not the sum of the numbers of independent and jointly sold policies as 
a small number of policies are distributed using both methods.   
Table 3: Policy characteristics and restrictions  
The table compares numerical measures of policy characteristics between 2010 and 2012     
 Panel A - 2010 T Test/ 
Z test  
2010 
Panel B - 2012 T Test/ 
Z test  
2012 Employed Full Time Ind. Joint Total Ind Joint Total 
Maximum number of 
monthly mortgage 
payments 
15.21 12.42 14.97 17.897** 13.35 12.00 13.33 19.89** 
Waiting period accident 
and sickness days before 
payments made (days). 
79.22 48.59 76.58 19.89** 86.61 59.57 86.34 9.79** 
Waiting period 
unemployment before 
payments made 
77.52 48.59 75.02 18.89** 86.62 59.57 86.35 9.80** 
Period for which pre-
existing conditions 
excluded (months) 
16.82 14.50 16.63 5.88** 17.17 16.80 17.17 0.342 
Back to day one cover (% 
of policies) 
40% 35% 39% 1.78* 31% 14% 31% 2.98** 
Portable policies which 
can be moved to different 
mortgages (% of policies) 
94% 34% 89% 32.52** 95% 46% 95% 18.01** 
Coverage of backache (% 
of policies) 
12% 85% 18% 32.49** 27% 18% 27% 1.52* 
Coverage of stress (% of 
policies) 
7% 82% 13% 37.65** 27% 20% 27% 1.25 
Number of Observations 3373 318 3691  6443 65 6508  
The T Test/Z Tests test the difference between the policy characteristics of independently and jointly sold 
policies. ** denotes statistically significant at 5%, * denotes 10% significance   
 
 Table 4 Panel A – Correlations between variables 2010 
The panel shows the correlation coefficients between the variables measuring policy characteristics in 2010 
 
Distribution 
Dummy 
Variable 
Benefit 
Coverage Age 
Max No. of 
payments 
Waiting 
period 
Accident and 
Sickness 
Waiting period 
Unemployment 
Back to 
day one 
cover 
Pre-existing 
period 
exclusion 
period Portability 
Coverage 
of 
Backache 
Coverage 
of Stress 
Distribution 
Dummy Variable 
1.000 -0.021 0.002 -0.025* -0.048** -0.048** -0.037** -0.005 -0.223** 0.019 0.015 
Benefit Coverage -0.021 1.000 -0.013 0.207** -0.029* -0.031* 0.055** -0.299** 0.031* 0.025* 0.025* 
Age 0.002 -0.013 1.000 0.014 0.012 0.012 -0.002 0.051** -0.008 0.031* 0.031* 
Max No. of 
payments 
-0.025* 0.207** 0.014 1.000 -0.050** -0.050** 0.098** -0.339** 0.085** 0.172** 0.172** 
Waiting period 
Accident and 
Sickness 
-0.048** -0.029* 0.012 -0.050** 1.000 0.321** -0.545** 0.063** 0.089** 0.091** 0.091** 
Waiting period 
Unemployment 
-0.048** -0.031* 0.012 -0.050** 0.321** 1.000 -0.234** 0.063** 0.089** 0.089** 0.089** 
Back to day one 
cover 
-0.037** 0.055** -0.002 0.098** -0.545** -0.234** 1.000 -0.152** -0.005 0.059** 0.060** 
Pre-existing period 
exclusion period 
-0.005 -0.299** 0.051** -0.339** 0.063** 0.063** -0.152** 1.000 0.001 -0.047** -0.047** 
Portability -0.223** 0.031* -0.008 0.085** 0.089** 0.089** -0.005 0.001 1.000 -0.083** -0.083** 
Coverage of 
Backache 
0.019 0.025* 0.031* 0.172** 0.091** 0.089** 0.059** -0.047** -0.083** 1.000 0.999** 
Coverage of Stress 0.015 0.025* 0.031* 0.172** 0.091** 0.089** 0.060** -0.047** -0.083** 0.999** 1.000 
** denotes statistically significant at 5%, * denotes 10% significance 
Table 4 Panel B – Correlations between Variables 2012  
The panel shows the correlation coefficients between the variables measuring policy characteristics in 2012 
** denotes statistically significant at 5%, * denotes 10% significance 
 
Distribution 
Dummy 
Variable 
Benefit 
Coverage 
Age 
Max No. of 
payments 
Waiting 
period 
Accident 
and Sickness 
Waiting period 
Unemployment 
Back to 
day one 
cover 
Pre-existing 
period 
exclusion 
period 
Portability 
Coverage 
of 
Backache 
Coverage 
of Stress 
Distribution 
Dummy Variable 
1.000 0.011 -0.004 0.138** 0.152** 0.147** 0.035* -0.140** 0.527** -0.523** -0.601** 
Benefit Coverage 0.011 1.000 -0.184** 0.052** 0.000 -0.007 0.024 -0.003 -0.017 0.022 0.011 
Age -0.004 -0.184** 1.000 -0.006 -0.001 0.000 -0.003 0.009 0.006 -0.004 -0.003 
Max No. of 
payments 
0.138** 0.052** -0.006 1.000 0.079** 0.097** 0.066** -0.131** 0.109** -0.239** -0.222** 
Waiting period 
Accident and 
Sickness 
0.152** 0.000 -0.001 0.079** 1.000 0.260** -0.544** -0.175** 0.149** -0.192** -0.150** 
Waiting period 
Unemployment 
0.147** -0.007 0.000 0.097** 0.260** 1.000 -0.170** -0.176** 0.143** -0.182** -0.142** 
Back to day one 
cover 
0.035* 0.024 -0.003 0.066** -0.544** -0.170** 1.000 0.186** -0.131** 0.003 -0.008 
Pre-existing period 
exclusion period 
-0.140** -0.003 0.009 -0.131** -0.175** -0.176** 0.186** 1.000 -0.087** 0.202** 0.235** 
Portability 0.527** -0.017 0.006 0.109** 0.149** 0.143** -0.131** -0.087** 1.000 -0.255** -0.310** 
Coverage of 
Backache 
-0.523** 0.022 -0.004 -0.239** -0.192** -0.182** 0.003 0.202** -0.255** 1.000 0.838** 
Coverage of Stress -0.601** 0.011 -0.003 -0.222** -0.150** -0.142** -0.008 0.235** -0.310** 0.838** 1.000 
Table 5: Hedonic Regression Models 2010  
This table reports the results for the hedonic regression models applied to 2010 policy data.  The figures reported are the coefficients of the various 
policy characteristics. 
 Panel A Panel B Panel C Panel D Panel E 
 
Independent 
Policies 
Joint Policies 
All Policies 
 
All Policies with Dummy 
for independent policies 
All Policies constrained to 
equal independent 
coefficients. Dummy for 
independent policies 
 B Std. Error B Std. Error B Std. Error B Std. Error B Std. Error 
Constant  2.267 0.072*** 2.836 0.093*** 2.475 0.050*** 2.442    0.051*** 2.412 0.022** 
Distribution dummy 
variable   
      
-0.137 0.033*** -0.145  0.023*** 
Benefit Coverage 0.001 0.000*** 0.001   0.000*** 0.009 0.000*** 0.001 0.000*** 0.032 N/A 
Age 0.010 0.000*** -0.001    0.001 0.032 0.001*** 0.001    0.000** 0.010 N/A 
Max No. of Payments 0.032 0.001*** 0.045   0.001*** 0.032 0.001*** 0.033    0.001** 0.032 N/A 
Waiting Period Accident 
and Sickness 
-0.001 0.000*** Omitted -0.001 0.000*** -0.001    0.000** -0.001  
Waiting Period 
Unemployment 
-0.001 0.000*** 0.006   0.001*** -0.002 0.000*** -0.001    0.000** -0.001 N/A 
Back to day one cover 0.030  0.016* -0.118  0.029*** 0.009   0.015 0.022    0.015 0.030 N/A 
Pre-existing period 
exclusion period 
-0.008 0.000*** 0.011 0.003** -0.009 0.001*** -0.008 0.001*** -0.008 N/A 
Portability 0.174 0.028*** -0.026   0.031 0.111 0.021*** -0.158 0.023*** 0.174 N/A 
Coverage of Backache 0.096 0.021*** -0.166 0.049** -0.136 0.017*** -0.096 0.020*** -0.097 N/A 
Coverage of Stress – suppressed – collinear with coverage of Backache 
R2 0.708 0.900 0.709 0.711  
Adj. R2 0.707 0.897 0.708 0.710  
F test 886.15*** 275.34*** 961.36*** 871.07***  
Observations 3305 253 3558 3558 3558 
e-D    87.190 or 12.81% discount 86.517 or 13.483% discount 
*** denotes statistical significant at 1%, ** denotes significant at 5%, * denotes 10% significance   
 
 
 Table 6: Hedonic Regression Model 2012  
This table reports the results for the hedonic regression models applied to 2012 policy data.  The figures reported are the coefficients of the various 
policy characteristics. 
 Panel A Panel B Panel C Panel D Panel E 
 
Independent 
Policies 
Joint Policies 
All Policies 
 
All Policies with 
Dummy for 
independent policies 
All Policies constrained to 
equal coefficients. Dummy for 
independent policies 
 B Std. Error B Std. Error B Std. Error B Std. Error B Std. Error 
Constant  2.249 0.049*** 2.734 0.171*** 2.250 0.048*** 2.210 0.069*** 1.823     0.053*** 
Distribution dummy 
variable   
      
0.048    0.054 -0.034        0.053 
Benefit Coverage 0.001 0.000*** 0.001 0.000*** 0.001 0.000*** 0.001 0.000*** 0.001 N/A 
Age 0.017 0.000*** 0.000    0.001 0.017 0.000*** 0.017 0.000*** 0.017 N/A 
Max No. of Payments 0.033 0.001*** omitted 0.033 0.001*** 0.033 0.001*** 0.033 N/A 
Waiting  Period Accident 
and sickness 
-0.001 0.000*** omitted -0.001 0.000*** -0.001 0.000*** -0.001 N/A 
Waiting Period 
Unemployment 
-0.002 0.000*** -0.015 0.001*** -0.002 0.000*** -0.002    0.000 -0.002 N/A 
Back to day one cover 0.024 0.014* omitted 0.0244   0.013* 0.023    0.014* 0.024 N/A 
Pre-existing period 
exclusion period 
-0.009 0.001*** -0.012 0.004** -0.009 0.001*** -0.009 0.001*** -0.009 N/A 
Portability -0.116 0.025*** -0.317 0.046*** -0.116 0.024*** -0.120 0.024*** -0.116 N/A 
Coverage of Backache -0.067 0.013*** 0.657 0.097*** -0.066 0.013*** -0.066 0.013*** -0.067 N/A 
Coverage of Stress – suppressed – collinear with coverage of Backache 
R2 0.735 0.955 0.734 0.734  
Adj. R2 0.734 0.950 0.733 0.733  
F test 1899.70*** 186.38*** 1909.07*** 1718.19***  
Observations 6190 60 6250 6250 6250 
e-D    104.917 or 4.92% increase 96.657 or 3.34% discount 
*** denotes statistical significant at 1%, ** denotes significant at 5%, * denotes 10% significance  
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Appendix 1: Firms offering MPPI in 2010 and 2012.  
2010 MPPI providers 
Abbey# HIGOS Pinnacle Insurance 
Alliance & Leicester# HMC Funding Principality BS 
Ant Insurance iprotect Royal Bank of Scotland 
Asu.ltd justclick4cover.com Scottish BS# 
Barclays# Leeds BS Security First 
Berkeley Alexander Leek United Select & Protect 
Best Insurance Legal & General Skipton BS# 
Britannia Lutine Standard Life# 
British Insurance Market Harborough BS# Stroud & Swindon BS 
British Insurance Brokers Millennium Insurance TenetLime Ltd 
Cheshire BS#  MMS The Co-operative Bank# 
Clydesdale Bank# Monmouthshire BS# The Co-operative Insurance# 
Columbus Direct Nationwide BS# The One account# 
Coventry BS# NatWest# Tipton & Coseley# 
Derbyshire# Newbury BS# Ukinsurancenet 
Direct Line# Northern Rock# Ulster Bank 
First Active Norwich & Peterborough BS# Webmoney 
Furness BS Paymentcare Ltd West Bromwich BS# 
getMy.com Paymentshield Yorkshire Bank# 
Halifax# Personal Touch Yorkshire BS# 
2012 MPPI providers 
3 X D Helpucover Pinnacle 
Ancile Insurance Services HIGOS PMI Partners (First Assist) 
Ant Insurance HMC Funding Principality BS 
APRIL UK iprotect Protect your bubble 
Asu.ltd Jump Money protection.uk.net 
Aviva justclick4cover.com Safeshield# 
Paymentshield London & Country Mortgages Ltd# Scottish BS# 
Barclays Mapfre Assistance Select & Protect 
Bennett Gould & Partners Ltd. Market Harborough BS# Sentinel 
Berkeley Alexander MMS Sequence 
British Insurance MoneyMart Sesame 
Burchell Edwards Monster Insurance Sharman Quinney 
Chorley & District BS# MORE TH>N Skipton BS 
Columbus Direct NatWest# Synergy Financial Products Ltd 
Compass Underwriting Openwork TenetLime Ltd 
Connells Pattison Lane The One account 
DMS Security Plans Payment Cover Tipton & Coseley# 
First Assist Payment Guard Towergate Home and Protect 
firstcallpaymentprotection.co.uk Paymentcare Ltd Uinsure 
getMy.com Paymentshield Universal Provident 
Hanley Economic BS Personal Touch  
BS = building society. # = distributing some policies jointly with a credit agreement.  
 
 
